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HERBICIDES AS AGENTS OF CHEMICAL 
WARFARE: THEIR IMPACT IN RELATION 
TO THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 
By Arthur H. Westing;:· 
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 contains the following declara-
tion: 
" ... Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been 
justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world; ... 
and to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as 
part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the prac-
tice of nations; declare: that the High Contracting Parties ... 
accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of 
bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between 
themselves according to the terms of this declaration .... " 
Despite our nation's vigorous support of the Geneva Protocol 
of 1925 during the period of its formulation and despite the re-
affirmation of its principles by various of our government 
spokesmen during the subsequent decades, we have not as yet 
ratified this landmark treaty. The United States aside, the list 
of ratifying or acceding nations includes all NATO members, all 
major industrial nations, and all nuclear weapon powers. The 
United States should end its status as a nonparty to the treaty 
as quickly as is possible. 
The tortured legal history and confused current status of the 
international control of chemical and biological weapons have 
been the subject of numerous scholarly analyses. In reading 
some of this materiaP one often finds that the intricacies and 
nuances of international law as it applies to war defy compre-
hension. One cannot help agreeing with one Norwegian diplomat 
who, during the course of the original Geneva Protocol delibera-
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tions, concluded that "you cannot regulate war; you can only 
abolish it."2 And yet it does appear both logical and prudent to 
yield to those who argue that by attempting to impose humani-
tarian restrictions on the conduct of war one is thereby buying 
time to provide some future generation with the opportunity 
"to bring about that unity which is peace."3 
Not only should the United States ratify the Geneva Protocol, 
but it should also strive to have one particular class of chemical 
weapons-the antiplant agents-specifically included in the 
Protocol's prohibition. This would be contrary to the present 
American position, which excludes herbicides as our nation 
ld " d d" (c. " h PIS I ' wou un erstan or mterpret t e rotoco. evera years 
study of the use of herbicides-study including three visits to 
Indochina (in December 1969, August 1970, and August 1971) to 
investigate at first hand the effects of such weapons-have con-
vinced me that herbicides can be at least as pernicious in their 
effects upon human beings and other living things as the agents 
that our government would agree to condemn. 
One could argue the inclusion of herbicides under the Geneva 
Protocol prohibition on a number of levels. One powerful argu-
ment is that a prohibition of chemicals as warfare agents, to be 
straightforward and unambiguous, should include them all 
rather than attempt to make quantitative distinctions based 
upon relative degree of toxicity or human impact. For nations 
cannot agree on where to draw the line. Indeed, the problem of 
interpretation arising from differences over herbicides between 
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. is already subverting whatever interna-
tional effectiveness the Geneva Protocol might have. A second 
impressive argument is to rely on the good legal and moral judg-
ment of the 82 or more other members of the world community of 
nations who have publicly condemned the use of herbicides as 
weapons of war.4 We should also consider the fact that only two 
foreign nations-Australia and Portugal-have publicly con-
doned such use. A third argument, and one that leads to my later 
remarks, is that we should heed the scientific and moral judgment 
of thousands of scientists (including at least 17 Nobel laureates 
and 129 members of the National Academy of Sciences) who 
have petitioned our government to renounce the use of herbicides 
as weapons. A number of scientific organizations have done 
likewise, including the nation's largest-the American Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Science. 
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Despite our absence from the list of Geneva Protocol ratifiers, 
we have over the decades and through several wars consistently 
guided our military actions to conform to the Protocol's prohibi-
tion, at least as we interpret it. Why is it then that we consider 
herbicidal chemicals to be permissible? It maybe surmised that, 
on the basis of civil experience, the presumption was made that 
properly chosen herbicides would kill or harm plants but not 
people. As such they would appear to be rather innocuous and 
even humane as weapons go. But, as used by the military, herbi-
cides have an alarming impact on the land and indigenous people 
only incidentally involved in a war, an impact that continues to 
be felt for years to come. Their use results in extended human 
suffering to noncombatants all out of porportion to any immedi-
ate military benefits that could be claimed for them. 
Herbicides have been used in combat primarily for two dis-
tinct purposes. In the first instance, they have been used for the 
destruction of forests in an attempt to deny daytime cover and 
sanctuary to the enemy. Roadsides and base perimeters are 
treated, as well as large contiguous areas of forest. The u.S. is 
apparently the only nation to have employed this tactic, having 
done so in Indochina since 1961 or 1962.5 In the second instance, 
herbicides have been used for the destruction of crops in an 
attempt to deny food to the enemy. The United Kingdom was 
apparently the first nation to have employed herbicides in this 
fashion, having used them briefly for crop destruction in Malaya 
during the early 1950's.6 The U.S. has been active in this regard 
in South Vietnam since 19617 as has Portugal since 1970 in 
Angola. 8 
A combination of military secrecy, paucity of critical analyses, 
wartime conditions, and apparent lack of official concern on the 
part of the user nations makes it very difficult to present a 
credible evaluation of the military value of these chemical wea-
pons. It also mak~s it difficult to make a definitive evaluation of 
the effects on the land and people. However, sufficient informa-
tion can be brought to bear on the subject to permit some ac-
curate generalizations to support my contention that herbicides 
should be proscribed as military weapons. In what follows, an 
attempt will be made to summarize the impact that these chemi-
cals have on the land and people where they are employed, i.e., 
their impact on the physical and human ecology, particularly in a 
tropical theatre of war.9 
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EFFECTS OF HERBICIDAL DESTRUCTION ON FOREST AND CROPS 
An evaluation of the effects of forest destruction through the 
military use of herbicides must perforce be limited to two forest 
types: tropical upland forest (or jungle) and tropical tidal forest 
(or mangrove swamp). Domestic and other civil herbicide ex-
perience with temperate forests is inapplicable because military 
usage involves much larger contiguous areas, much higher dose 
rates, much more frequent retreatments, and a very different 
habitat. 
Tropical Upland Forest ('Jungle) 
In order for herbicidal applications to have significant military 
effectiveness, a tropical upland forest (or jungle) must be sprayed 
with dosages exceeding normal civil practice by ten or even 
twenty fold; in order to sustain the military advantage, treat-
ment must usually be repeated. When such a forest is treated 
more than once, 70% to 80% or more of the trees are killed. The 
extant forest resource is thereby largely destroyed. The treated 
area is subsequently invaded by clearly inferior plants (inferior 
both ecologically and economically). The most likely of such 
invaders are either cogon grass (Imperata) or low-growing, 
shrubby bamboos (e.g., Bambusa, Thyrsostachys), both notori-
ous as pests throughout the tropics. 
Once cogon grass has become established, its deep root system 
and efficient means of propagation make it most difficult (and 
prohibitively expensive) to eradicate. If nature is left to its own 
devices, and if fire is not a factor, forest will reestablish itself 
over a period of one or two decades. On the other hand, should 
the area be subjected to occasional wild fires, the cogon grass 
could remain the dominant vegetation indefinitely (forming a 
semi-permanent tropical grass savannah). It must be added that 
cogon grass is unpalatable to livestock. 
Once the worthless bamboos become established, they form 
extensive thickets (or bamboo "brakes") which are likely to 
remain in place for man y decades. The tropical forest tree species 
that originally occupied the site are presented a possible oppor-
tunity to regain a foothold only once every several decades, at 
the time of general flowering and stem (culm) death. As an 
indication of their permanence, tropical ecologists think of these 
bamboo brakes as a type of climax vegetation. 
Beyond the obvious destruction of the forest resource (i.e., of 
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the timber trees themselves) and the lengthy delay prior to its 
reestablishment, there is also considerable subtle damage done 
to the treated tropical upland forest ecosystem. The major por-
tion of the nutrients in a tropical forest ecosystem is stored in the 
vegetation (largely in the leaves). Following an herbicidal 
attack, the leaves drop and quickly rot, releasing their nutrient 
content. These nutrients are then washed away, for tropical soils 
are largely unable to capture and store nutrients. Once lost to 
the ecosystem, the nutrients will not become restored via natural 
processes for many decades. The productivity of such land thus 
becomes significantly diminished for an extended period of time. 
The drastically altered flora in turn has a major impact on 
the indigenous fauna, all of which depends directly or indirectly 
on the vegetation for food and cover. A large number of species 
will be eliminated from the area, and the replacement com-
munity will have higher numbers of fewer species, some of them 
(including vectors, i.e., disease carriers) in pest proportions. The 
animals can also be harmed directly by herbicides, the extent of 
such damage depending, of course, upon which chemicals are 
being employed. In South Vietnam, for example, one of the 
herbicides used (2,4,5-T) contained an unknown impurity (di-
oxin) that was subsequently demonstrated by the u.S. Food and 
Drug Administration to be highly toxic to animals and to cause 
birth defects (i.e., to be teratogenic) as welUo 
Tropical Tidal Forest (Mangrove Swamp) 
When a tropical tidal forest (or mangrove swamp) is treated 
with herbicides even once, all of the vegetation is killed outright. 
Moreover, the ability of new vegetation to recolonize such an 
area seems to be prevented permanently. Areas sprayed by our 
armed forces in South Vietnam as long as eight years ago still 
show virtually no sign of recovery. The reasons for such a re-
markabl y drastic effect are still obscure, but the fact remains: 
appalling environmental damage results from an herbicidal 
attack on such a habitat. 
Beyond the obvious destruction of the forest resource (impor-
tant as a source of firewood or charcoal wood and of tannin), 
there is less immediately apparent damage. The endless reticula-
tion of water channels throughout a mangrove swamp normally 
supports a rich variety of aquatic animals, including numerous 
commercial offshore and upstream fishes and crustaceans such 
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as shrimp. An herbicidally attacked area can no longer support 
these animals. Moreover, the coastline, no longer protected 
against wind and tide and wave, becomes subject to erosion. 
Destruction of tropical tidal forest, being of indefinite duration, 
is frightening in its possible consequences. 
It should be apparent from the foregoing that the use of chemi-
cal plant poisons in warfare causes large areas to be laid waste 
and that the resulting devastation will be felt for many decades 
into the future. It is felt largely by the civil population at the 
time of application, and will be felt by their innocent offspring 
in the generations to follow. Small wonder that one eminent 
biologist recently was forced to coin an ominous new word for 
the English language, 'ecocide.' 
Crop Destruction 
No lengthy statement will be made on the military use of 
herbicides for crop destruction. Such use, when it affects largely 
the civil population-as it inevitably seems to-is prohibited by 
the Hague Convention of 1907. This is a treaty to which we are 
already a party and one whose principles we reaffirmed at the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials following vVorld War IIY 
It must be said, however, that in addition to any intentional 
food destruction by herbicides, there is also a large amount of 
unintentional and incidental food destruction during many 
forest destruction missions. What is particularly appalling, both 
in Cambodia and South Vietnam, is the extent and seriousness of 
such damage. It is difficult for an affluent westerner to realize 
the enormous impact that crop and fruit tree destruction has 
on a semi-destitute peasant who is totally dependent upon his 
own produce for his very existence and that of his family. He 
either stays and starves or else embarks on the miserable life of 
a refugee. In either event, hunger and malnutrition add to his 
already formidable burden. 
DIRECT TOXICITY OF HERBICIDES TO MAN 
Herbicides are a class of chemicals having in common the 
ability to kill plants. However, since all living things-both 
plants and animals-share certain biological processes, each of 
these chemicals has the addi tional potential of being more or less 
injurious to man and other animals. (Such chemicals could be 
toxic or cause birth defects, mutations, or cancer.) Even if ex-
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tensive prior testing is carried out, such side effects may become 
apparent only after the herbicide has been in use for a number 
of years. By then the damage might be done and it would be too 
late to reverse the error. 
By way of example, our military used 47 million pounds of 
2,4,5-T in Indochina over a period of eight years before it was 
disc?v~red that somethin~ o~ the order of one thousand pounds 
of dIOXin-One of the mostpOlsonous substances known to man-
was inadvertently (and through no fault of the military) being 
applied as an unsuspected impurity. As another possible example, 
who knows whether the six million pounds of cacodylic acid 
(containing three million pounds of elemental arsenic) will not 
eventually become a health hazard to the civil population in the 
areas treated? 
In actual practice, where massive and often indiscriminate 
applications of any chemical are involved, it becomes virtually 
impossible to determine whether that chemical eventually will 
prove to be harmful to humans or not. And this does not even 
take into account the indirect effects resulting from herbicide-
caused food denial or displacement. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, it is my thesis that no chemical is suitable for 
use as a weapon, no matter how harmless it might seem to be on 
the basis of domestic, civil experience. When a chemical is intro-
duced massively over wide areas, neither the short-term nor the 
long-term ecological and public health ramifications are pre-
dictable. Moreover, current experience shows that the brunt 
of such a chemical attack is felt by the civil population and the 
land upon which these people depend for their wellbeing and 
livelihood-and that this effect will continue to be felt long 
after the use of the chemical ceases. 
My conclusion-based upon both biological and humanitarian 
considerations-is that herbicides are chemicals requiring in-
clusion under the prohibition of the Geneva Protocol, that they 
are "analogous ... materials ... justly condemned by the gen-
eral opinion of the civilized world."12 It is a conclusion I share 
with numerous biologists here and abroad. Moreover, it might 
be useful to add that even when all pertinent considerations-
both military and civil-are taken into account, the decision 
can go against the use of herbicides. Recently, Ellsworth Bunker, 
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our ambassador to Saigon, and Creighton Abrams, the com-
manding general of our military assistance command there, 
jointly recommended the complete cessation of our use of herbi-
cides in South VietnamY 
.. +.--->-.-<--. .•.. 
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